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 1. Introduction 
The result of the 2015 UK General Election came as a shock to most observers. During the months and 
weeks leading up to election day on the 7th of May, the opinion polls consistently indicated that the 
outcome was too close to call and the prospect of a hung parliament therefore appeared almost 
inevitable. Although there was some variation across polling companies in their estimates of the party 
vote shares, their estimates of the difference between the Conservative and Labour Parties exceeded 
two percentage points in only 19 out of 91 polls during the short campaign from the 30th of March, 
with zero as the modal estimate of the Conservative lead.  
The poll-induced expectation of a dead heat undoubtedly informed party strategies and media 
coverage during the campaign and may ultimately have influenced the result itself, albeit in ways that 
are difficult to determine satisfactorily.  In the event, the Conservative Party won a narrow 
parliamentary majority, taking 37.7% of the popular vote in Great Britain (and 330 of the 650 seats in 
the House of Commons), compared to 31.2% for the Labour Party (232 seats; see Hawkins, et al. 2015 
for the official results).  The magnitude of the errors on the Conservative lead, as well as the 
consistency of the error across polling companies (henceforth referred to as “pollsters”) strongly 
suggests that systematic factors, rather than sampling variability, were the primary causes of the 
discrepancy. 
Table 1 presents the final published vote intention estimates for the nine pollsters that were members 
of the British Polling Council (BPC) at the time of the election, plus three non-members who published 
estimates. The estimates for the smaller parties are close to the election result, with mean absolute 
errors (MAE) of 0.9%, 1.4%, 1.3%, and 1.1% for the Liberal Democrats, UKIP, Greens and other parties 
(combined) respectively, all of which are within the pollsters’ notional margins of error for party shares 
due to sampling variability (which are usually stated as +/– 3% for point estimates).  However, for the 
crucial estimate of the difference between the two main parties, eleven of the twelve Great Britain 
polls in Table 1 were some way from the true value, and attention has naturally focused on this error. 
 While the election result saw Labour trail the Conservatives by 6.5 percentage points, five polls in the 
final week reported a dead heat, three reported a 1% lead for the Conservatives, two a 1% lead for 
Labour, and one a 2% lead for Labour. For all nine BPC members, the notional +/- 3% margin of error 
does not contain the true election result. SurveyMonkey published the only final poll to estimate the 
lead correctly, although their estimates were too low for both the Conservatives and Labour and, 
indeed, had higher MAE across all parties than the average of the other polls.  
----- [Table 1 here] ----- 
In Scotland, the three polls conducted in the final week over-estimated the Labour vote share by an 
average of 2.4 and under-estimated the SNP share by 2.7 percentage points.  The average error of 5.1 
percentage points on the lead of the SNP over Labour in Scotland was only slightly smaller than the 
average error on the lead of the Conservatives over Labour in the polls for Great Britain.  
These errors were not just a cause of embarrassment for the pollsters. Media sponsors publicly 
questioned the quality and value of the research they had commissioned, with at least one national 
newspaper stating that it would afford less prominence to election polling in its political coverage in 
the future.  Politicians and peers suggested that the polling inaccuracies had affected the outcome of 
the election, speculating that Labour might have done better had the polls been accurate.  A private 
members’ bill was introduced in the House of Lords on the 28th of May, proposing state regulation of 
the polling industry (Regulation of Political Opinion Polling Bill [HL] 2015-16).  Concern was also 
expressed by social and market research industry professionals; as the most direct way the public 
encounters survey and opinion research, it was feared that the failure of the polls might have negative 
consequences for public confidence in social and market research and official statistics more generally.   
It is therefore important that we obtain an understanding of what went wrong with the general 
election opinion polls in 2015, in order that the risks of similar failures in the future are reduced. This 
is our objective in this paper. We draw upon the findings and conclusions set out in the report of the 
 inquiry into the failure of the polls in 2015 that was established by the British Polling Council and 
Market Research Society (Sturgis et al 2016). In addition to the material contained in that report, we 
provide a more detailed and formal account of the methodology of vote share estimation using 
opinion polls, drawing out the key assumptions upon which the methodology is based and using this 
to structure our presentation and interpretation of findings. We also set out a new procedure which 
can be used to produce estimates of the sampling variability of opinion polls collected using quota 
sampling, which better reflect their design than the (sample size invariant) +/- 3% rule of thumb for 
the ‘margin of error’. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the methodology of the 
2015 opinion polls, the assumptions required for valid point estimation, and the new methodology for 
variance estimation. The data we used to evaluate the causes of the polling errors is described in 
Section 3 and the results and interpretation of our analyses are in Section 4, where we focus on the 
three key potential factors: late swing, turnout weighting, and sampling. Our conclusion from these 
analyses is that the polling miss in 2015 occurred because the procedures used by the pollsters to 
recruit respondents produced samples which were unrepresentative of the target population’s voting 
intentions. These biases were not mitigated by the statistical adjustments that pollsters applied to the 
raw data. Other factors made, at most, a very modest contribution. Concluding remarks are given in 
Section 5.  
 
2. The methodology of pre-election polls  
2.1 Point estimation of vote shares 
The polls conducted before the 2015 general election employed one of two data collection modes: 
online self-completion, or computer assisted telephone interviewing. The operational procedures 
employed to recruit respondents within each of these modes were diverse and incorporated a range 
 of random and purposive selection mechanisms (see Sturgis et al 2016 for a more detailed account of 
these procedures). All GB pollsters, however, took a common general approach to sampling and 
estimation: they assembled a quota sample of eligible individuals, calculated a weight to match the 
sample to known population distributions for a set of auxiliary variables and a weight to account for 
differential likelihood of voting. They then combined these two weights and produced weighted 
estimates of vote intention for the population of voters from the sample data.  
It is useful for our later evaluation of the potential causes of the polling errors to describe this general 
approach in more formal terms.  Our specification here draws on previous treatments of the 
assumptions required for the validity of point estimation using quota sampling (Smith 1983; Deville 
1991), extended to accommodate the inclusion of turnout probabilities. It is important to note that 
we do not claim that this is how the pollsters explicitly motivate their methodology but it is, 
nonetheless, implicit in the procedures as they are implemented.  We first define a set of variables 
which are relevant for the estimation of party vote shares for the target population. These are all 
characteristics of individuals and are, in practice, treated as categorical variables, whatever their 
natural metric. We denote by X auxiliary variables which will be used to derive weights to match 
population distributions, and by L additional variables which will be used to predict the probability 
that an individual will vote in the election.  In a typical poll, X includes characteristics such as sex, age, 
region, and social class, as well as measures of party identification or vote in the previous election, 
while L is an individual’s self-assessment of how likely he or she is to vote in the election. Further, let 
V denote the party the individual reports he or she intends to vote for (after “Don’t know” answers 
and refusals have been dropped or imputed to specific parties), T an indicator of whether the 
individual actually voted in the election (with T=1 for yes and T=0 for no), P the party (if any) they 
actually voted for, and S an indicator of whether or not an individual is included in the sample (S=1 for 
yes and S=0 for no). 
 Consider first X partitioned as (X(1),…,X(p)), where the subsets X(j) are such that their distributions p(X(j)) 
in a population are known from the census or other sources. The X(j) are typically univariate, although 
with some exceptions (e.g. age distribution may be specified separately by sex). These known 
distributions define the target population of the poll. The target population should include (but need 
not be limited to) all individuals who may eventually vote in the election. When interviews have been 
completed, post-stratification weights are calculated such that 𝑝(𝑋(𝑗)|𝑆 = 1) = 𝑝(𝑋(𝑗)) , i.e. the 
distributions of all X(j) in the weighted sample match the distributions in the population (we denote 
marginal and conditional distributions of variables by p(.) and p(.|.)).  
The goal of a vote intention poll is to estimate p(V|T=1) in the population, i.e. the distribution of 
responses to the question on party choice among those members of the population who will turn out 
to vote. This can be expressed as  
                                 𝑝(𝑉|𝑇 = 1) ∝  ∑ 𝑝(𝑇 = 1|𝑉, 𝐿, 𝑋) 𝑝(𝑉, 𝐿|𝑋)𝑋,𝐿 𝑝(𝑋)                                         (1)                      
where the sum is over the possible values of L and X. Here p(X), p(V,L|X) and p(T=1|V,L,X) describe the 
population distribution of the weighting variables, distribution of voting intention and stated 
likelihood to vote, and probability of turnout respectively. To estimate this quantity, a poll draws a 
sample of respondents (S=1), selected through quota sampling with quota targets defined by a subset 
of X, and elicits values of (X, L, V) from the sampled respondents via questionnaire. Turnout T is not 
known at the time of the poll, except for respondents who have already voted by post.  Letting 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑛 index the sampled respondents, the post-stratification weights 𝑤𝑖
∗ are then calculated. The 
distribution of (𝑉𝑖, 𝐿𝑖, 𝑋𝑖)  in the sample, with weights 𝑤𝑖
∗ , is used as an estimate of 
p(V,L,X)=p(V,L|X)p(X) in the population. Next, let 𝑝𝑇𝑖  denote values of 𝑝(𝑇𝑖 = 1|𝑉𝑖, 𝐿𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) assigned for 
each respondent from an assumed model for the turnout probabilities, and define 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑤𝑖
∗ . 
Letting  𝐼(𝑉𝑖 = 𝑣) be an indicator variable for any particular party 𝑣 which is 1 if a respondent’s stated 
vote intention is  𝑉𝑖 = 𝑣 and 0 otherwise, the vote intention proportions for the parties are estimated 
by the weighted proportions 
       ?̂?(𝑉 = 𝑣|𝑇 = 1) =
∑ 𝐼(𝑉𝑖 = 𝑣)𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
.                                     (2) 
Using (2) to estimate p(V=v|T=1) implies a number of assumptions about the quantities on the right-
hand side of (1). First, it is assumed that the 𝑝𝑇𝑖  assigned to respondents are equal to the probabilities 
𝑝(𝑇𝑖 = 1|𝑉𝑖, 𝐿𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖)  under the conditional distribution of turnout given (V,L,X) in the population.  
Second, it is assumed that 𝑝(𝑉, 𝐿|𝑋, 𝑆 = 1) = 𝑝(𝑉, 𝐿|𝑋) , i.e. that the (𝑉𝑖, 𝐿𝑖)  in the sample 
(unweighted, since the weights 𝑤𝑖
∗ are constant given X) can be treated as random variables drawn 
from their distribution in the population, at each level of the variables X which are used to derive the 
post-stratification weights. We refer to this as the assumption of representative sampling. It is weaker 
than the requirement of representativeness given only the quota variables, which are typically only a 
subset of X.  
These two assumptions are still not sufficient for fully valid estimation of p(V=1|T=1) because the post-
stratification weights ensure only that 𝑝(𝑋(𝑗)|𝑆 = 1) = 𝑝(𝑋(𝑗)) for the marginal distributions of X(j)  
but not for the joint distribution p(X) in (1). This problem is removed if it can be assumed that 
𝑝(𝑋|𝑆 = 1) = 𝑝(𝑋), which is to say that the sample is (fortuitously) representative in the higher-order 
associations among the X which have not been fixed to match population totals. Alternatively, 
estimation with (2) is also valid if the true conditional distributions of (V,L) and T are such that only 
the 𝑝(𝑋(𝑗)) actually contribute to (1). This is the case, for example, if both 𝑝(𝑇 = 1|𝑉, 𝐿, 𝑋) and 
𝑝(𝑉, 𝐿|𝑋) are linear functions of their explanatory variables and the product of these functions does 
not involve any products of X(j) and X(k) (𝑗 ≠ 𝑘). This is true, for instance, in cases where 𝑝(𝑉, 𝐿|𝑋) does 
not depend on interactions among the X(j) and 𝑝(𝑇 = 1|𝑉, 𝐿, 𝑋) = 𝑝(𝑇 = 1|𝑉, 𝐿) does not depend on  
X.   
If these assumptions hold, it is possible to estimate the distribution of stated vote intentions V among 
eventual voters. What commissioners and consumers of polls really want to know, however, is not the 
distribution of V but the distribution of actual votes in the election P. A pre-election poll cannot, 
 though, provide direct information about P because P does not exist (except for postal voters) until 
election day. To interpret the poll estimates using (2) as actual vote shares, it must also be assumed 
that 𝑝(𝑉|𝑇 = 1) = 𝑝(𝑃|𝑇 = 1). This will be true if 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 for every individual, but also if individual-
level changes between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖 are self-cancelling in aggregate.   
In summary, the key assumptions which underlie the estimates of pre-election polls as they were 
conducted for the 2015 UK General Election are the following: 
(A1) Representative sampling: Given any value of the weighting variables X, observations (𝑉𝑖, 𝐿𝑖) in 
the poll can be treated as a random sample (with equal inclusion probabilities) from 𝑝(𝑉, 𝐿|𝑋) in the 
population;  
(A2) Correct model for turnout probabilities: The assigned turnout weights 𝑝𝑇𝑖  are equal to the 
probabilities 𝑝(𝑇𝑖 = 1|𝑉𝑖, 𝐿𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) from the conditional distribution of T which holds in the population;  
(A3) Agreement between stated vote intention and actual vote:  𝑝(𝑉|𝑇 = 1) = 𝑝(𝑃|𝑇 = 1) , i.e. 
people do not change their vote between the time the poll was undertaken and the election, or they 
do so in ways that are self-cancelling in the aggregate; 
together with the additional conditions on the distributions of X, (V,L), and T that were discussed 
above. If assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold, (2) provides consistent estimates of the vote intentions 
p(V|T=1), and if (A3) holds as well, of the actual vote shares p(P|T=1). It is unlikely in practice that 
these assumptions will be exactly satisfied, so it is better to regard them as ideal conditions which the 
polls should aim to be as close to as possible in order to produce reasonable estimates.  
These assumptions are stringent. (A1) requires that the samples are representative given the 
weighting variables, even though in quota sampling the sampling probabilities are not known and will 
likely be zero for some members of the population, and even though robust population data for 
weighting is limited. (A2) requires that turnout probabilities can be modelled to a high degree of 
accuracy, even though there is little in the way of evidence on which to base such a prediction.  (A3) 
 requires that respondents’ pre-election vote intentions accurately represent their actual votes.  All of 
these conditions are prone to violation at any given election and may fail in ways that cause large 
errors in estimated vote shares. In section 4 we examine evidence of such failures in the 2015 polls 
for each of the assumptions.   
2.2 Sampling variability of point estimates 
We concluded from Table 1 that the 2015 polling miss was not due to random sampling error. However, 
this conclusion is based on the rather unsatisfactory notion of a +/- 3% ‘margin of error’ applied to any 
point estimate for a proportion, which is currently used by UK pollsters.  This rule of thumb is derived 
under an “as if” assumption of simple random sampling for a sample of size of 1000, a common sample 
size for opinion polls. This heuristic is clearly not appropriate for the sample designs of the 2015 polls. 
Yet, ignoring their sampling variability is clearly unsatisfactory and, indeed, the recent American 
Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Task Force on non-probability sampling 
recommended that “… users of non-probability samples should be encouraged to report measures of 
the precision of their estimates” (Baker, et al. 2013). Here, we propose a more principled method of 
calculating the precision of poll estimates from quota samples, which better reflects their sample 
design.  
This is a bootstrap re-sampling method which involves the following three steps: (i) draw M 
independent samples by sampling respondents from the full achieved sample, with replacement and 
in a way which matches the quota sampling design; (ii) for each sample thus drawn, calculate the point 
estimates of interest in the same way as for the original sample, including post-stratification and 
turnout weighting; and (iii) use the distribution of the estimates from the M resamples to quantify the 
uncertainty in the poll estimates. This draws on the basic ideas of bootstrap estimation in general 
(Davison and Hinkley 1997) and for probability samples in particular (Wolter 2007). For non-
probability samples, a comparable approach has been proposed by de Munnik et al. (2013), although 
they used it to assess the quality of a sampling design by resampling from a simulated population, 
 rather than the sample itself.  An alternative approach to estimating uncertainty would be to adapt 
variance formulas that are used with probability sampling, under appropriate assumptions about the 
nature of the quota samples (Deville 1991). It would be difficult using this approach, however, to 
accommodate specific features of the poll estimation, such as post-stratification and turnout 
weighting, which are easily accounted for in the bootstrap method.  
Bootstrapping assumes, in essence, that the observed sample is representative of what would be 
observed in other hypothetical samples drawn using the same sampling design. The resulting 
measures of uncertainty therefore describe how much estimates vary from one such sample to 
another, around their average values.  It is important to note that this is not the same as the variation 
of estimates around their true values (i.e. mean squared errors), unless the assumptions stated in 
Section 2.1 are satisfied and the estimates are thus approximately unbiased.  
To implement the resampling step (ii), the analyst would ideally know the exact procedures through 
which the quota sampling was implemented, but these specific details are not available to us. In our 
calculations for the 2015 polls, we have therefore used the following algorithm which represents the 
generic features of quota sampling.  First, we set the quota targets to be the realised sample 
distributions of the quota variables that were used by a given pollster. In the first iteration of the 
resampling, the pool of potential respondents is the full observed sample, from which we draw a 
sample of the same size as the full sample, but with replacement. We then drop from this first iteration 
sample any observations which overfill a quota category, and retain the rest. For the next iteration of 
the sampling, the pool of potential respondents now consists only of those that are in quota categories 
which remain to be filled. The sample size of the second iteration is now the number of observations 
that need to be added in order to reach the original sample size. In other words, at each iteration the 
retained sample is ‘topped up’ through a resample drawn from the quota categories which are not yet 
full. Additional iterations continue until all the quotas are full, or until there are no respondents in the 
original sample who belong to all the incomplete quota categories at once. In the latter case we could 
 run the algorithm again, or use the sample obtained at this point, even though it is slightly smaller 
than the observed sample. For the estimates presented here, we used the latter strategy. A more 
detailed statement of the algorithm, computer code and an example are included in the 
supplementary materials to this article.   
Results from the bootstrap estimation of sampling variability in the final polls are presented in Table 
2. It shows point estimates and 95% interval estimates of the Conservative-Labour difference in vote 
shares. These are adjusted percentile intervals (Davison and Hinkley, 1997), although standard 
percentile intervals and symmetric normal intervals give similar results. None of the intervals in Table 
2 includes the election result of a 6.5-point Conservative lead. We can therefore be confident, by using 
this more principled approach, in our initial conclusion that the polling miss was not due to sampling 
variability.  
----- [Table 2 here] ----- 
Table 2 also shows bootstrap standard errors of the estimated vote shares for the Conservatives and 
for Labour. We can compare these with a notional “margin of error” obtained if the poll sample is 
treated as a simple random sample (SRS), where the sampling variance for an estimated vote share p 
from a sample of size N is given by p(100-p)/N. Table 2 shows estimated design effects (d2) for the 
vote shares, calculated by dividing the bootstrap variance by the variance under SRS, with p as the 
estimated share and N the number of respondents who gave a vote intention (this N ignores the 
variability in the turnout probabilities, so likely underestimates the design effect). Most of the design 
effects are less than 1, indicating that the sampling variability is smaller than would be expected under 
simple random sampling.  When this is the case,  the conventional margins of error somewhat 
overestimate the sampling variability in the poll estimates. The increased efficiency of the estimates 
is mainly due to conditioning on variables measuring party affiliation or past voting, which are strongly 
correlated with current vote intention (all pollsters except Ipsos-MORI used this type of variable in 
 their post-stratification weighting). If these variables are omitted from the quotas and weighting, all 
design effects in Table 2 are greater than 1, with values between 1.04 and 1.68.  
3. Data  
Our main evidence for assessing the source of the polling errors in 2015 is data from the polls 
themselves.  Each of the nine BPC members provided respondent-level micro-data, together with 
documentation on their methodology, including fieldwork procedures, quota targets and weighting.  
These data were provided for the first, penultimate, and final polls conducted during the short 
campaign but almost all of the analyses reported in this article use only the final polls (i.e. the nine 
polls conducted by the BPC members in Table 1).  The six pollsters who carried out surveys where 
respondents were re-contacted after the election also provided these data sets (these are discussed 
in Section 4.2). We were able to replicate all published estimates for these 27 pre-election polls, 
enabling us to exclude the possibility that flawed analysis or use of inaccurate weighting targets 
contributed to the polling miss.  
We also analysed data from the 2015 rounds of the British Election Study (BES) and the British Social 
Attitudes Survey (BSA) in order to benchmark the poll estimates against surveys which use random 
probability sample designs. The methodology of these surveys is described in detail elsewhere 
(Fieldhouse, et al. 2015; Clery et al. 2016), but, in brief (and for both surveys), a multi-stage, stratified 
probability sample of addresses is drawn from the Post Office Address File and an interview is 
attempted with a randomly selected eligible adult at each eligible address.  Multiple calls are made to 
each selected address at different times of day and on different days of the week in order to achieve 
an interview.  Substitutions for sampled respondents who were not reached or who declined to be 
interviewed are not permitted. Interviews are carried out face-to-face by trained interviewers via 
questionnaires loaded on to laptop computers. The BES and BSA attained response rates of 56% and 
51% (AAPOR Response Rate 1), respectively, which though not especially high in historical terms, are 
 good by contemporary standards. The interviews were carried out after the election, in May-October 
2015.  
 
4. Assessment of potential causes of the polling errors 
In this section we assess the evidence in support of the different potential causes of the errors in the 
2015 polls. The discussion is structured around the three core assumptions set out in Section 2, with 
assumption (A3) considered in Section 4.1 (under the heading of ‘Late swing’), turnout weighting (A2) 
in Section 4.2, and representative sampling (A1) in Section 4.3.  
In the polling inquiry report, the following more minor factors were also considered and dismissed as 
contributory causes of the polling errors: treatment of postal voters, overseas voters, voter 
registration, question wording and order, and mode of interview. While we do not consider these 
factors directly in this paper, it should be noted that each can be understood as violations of the three 
key assumptions that are covered in the following sections. For instance, errors due to omission of 
overseas and postal voters would be violations of assumption A1 on representative sampling, while 
errors due to question wording or measurement mode would fall under violation of assumption A3, 
that stated vote intention is equal to the actual vote. Likewise, un-registered voters would be a 
particular violation of assumption A2, that the turnout probabilities are correct. More detail on the 
specific reasons for ruling out these factors is provided in Sturgis et al (2016). Neither do we discuss 
here the phenomenon of ‘herding’, which is when pollster behaviour produces more consensus across 
poll estimates than would be expected under random sampling, as appears to have been the case in 
2015. We do not consider herding because it relates to the variability of estimates across polls, rather 
than to bias in poll estimates (Sturgis et al 2016). 
 
4.1 Late swing 
 Some voters agree to take part in opinion polls but do not disclose the party they intend to vote for.  
Others do not know who they will support, deliberately misreport their vote intention, or report their 
intention truthfully but then change their minds after the poll. If a sufficient number of these types of 
voters move disproportionately to different parties between the polls and election day, vote shares 
estimated from the polls will differ from the election result. This discrepancy will not be due to 
inaccuracy of the polls as estimates of the stated vote intentions, but to inadequacy of the assumption 
(A3) that the stated intentions (V) can be treated as a measure of the actual vote (P). Following 
convention in the polling literature, we refer to a difference between V and P as late swing. The term 
refers most naturally to a switching from one party to another, but we also include movement from 
non-substantive responses (Don’t Knows and refusals) to a party choice.  
Reports into the polling failures at the 1970 (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971) and 1992 (Market 
Research Society 1994) elections both attributed a prominent role to late swing. This was particularly 
so for the 1970 report, which concluded that late swing was almost entirely to blame for the failure 
to predict the Conservative victory in that election. It has also been identified as a contributory factor 
for polling misses in the United States (AAPOR 2009; Keeter, et al. 2016). There are, therefore, good 
prima facie grounds for assuming that late swing may have contributed to the polling miss in 2015. 
The most direct way of assessing late swing is to examine data from re-contact surveys, where the 
same respondents have been interviewed both before and after the election. Six pollsters carried out 
such surveys, although one proved to be unusable for our purposes because fieldwork outcomes did 
not distinguish between refusals and non-voters. For the analysis of late swing we use only the 
samples of voters who reported after the election that they had voted, which means that turnout 
weights are not needed and assumption A2 is not required. Because not all respondents that were 
recontacted provided an interview, the estimates are weighted by the product of the pre-election 
post-stratification weight and an attrition weight. The attrition weight was calculated as the inverse 
of the predicted probability of responding to the re-contact survey, derived from a logistic regression 
 model, where the predictor variables were all the variables used for weighting in the final poll, plus 
the question on likelihood to vote if used for the poll. For two pollsters the sample sizes for the 
recontact surveys were very small but in these cases it was possible to include respondents who were 
interviewed in earlier polls for the same company during the short campaign.  
----- [Table 3 here] ----- 
Table 3 shows point estimates of the Conservative lead over Labour for these five samples, from the 
pre-election polls and the re-contact surveys. In four of the five polls the post-election estimates move 
in the direction of a larger lead for the Conservatives, and in one poll (the one with the largest sample 
size) in the opposite direction. The average change toward the Conservatives weighting all five polls 
equally is 1.8 points, and the average weighted by sample size is 0.6 points. If only respondents from 
the final polls are included, the (unweighted) average is -0.4 points.  Regardless of which estimates 
one prefers, this is not nearly enough to explain the total error in the polls.  
A frequently advanced explanation of polling errors by media commentators is deliberate 
misreporting, which is when respondents knowingly tell pollsters that they will vote for a particular 
party when they actually intend to vote for a different one. This is generally considered to occur, not 
out of capriciousness or spite against pollsters, but due to processes of social desirability. For example, 
in the UK, deliberate misreporting has been invoked to explain the tendency of polls to under-estimate 
the Conservative vote as a result of respondents being unwilling to admit to voting Conservative – so-
called ‘shy Tories’. But the same phenomenon could apply to any party that voters feel embarrassed 
to admit to supporting due to there being some sort of social stigma associated with it.  
A response pattern of deliberate misreporting of voting intention is indistinguishable from late swing; 
the individual tells the pollster they will vote for party A but subsequently votes for party B. Whether 
their initial report was a deliberate misreport is neither here nor there with regard to the pattern of 
response that is observed. Our conclusions about late swing therefore also enable us to rule out 
 deliberate misreporting as a cause of the polling miss. A limitation to this conclusion is that actual vote 
could also be deliberately misreported in the recontact surveys, that is respondents could lie both 
before and after the election. It is very difficult to definitively rule out this possibility, but indirect 
evidence suggests that it is unlikely. In particular, the two post-election random probability surveys – 
the British Election Study and the British Social Attitudes survey - got the election result about right 
(as discussed in Section 4.3), with both producing estimates of the Conservative vote share that were 
actually slightly above the result. We see no reason to assume that respondents should choose to 
deliberately misreport their past vote in some post-election surveys but not in others. In summary 
then, we rule out violations of assumption A3 such as late swing and deliberate misreporting, as having 
made any notable contribution to the polling miss. 
4.2 Turnout weighting  
The pollsters used a range of different methods for constructing turnout weights  𝑝𝑇𝑖. Most relied on 
responses to a self-reported likelihood-to-vote (LTV) question such as, "how likely is it that you will 
vote in the general election on 7th May?", to which responses were recorded on scales of between 
four and eleven points. Some pollsters used the question as a binary filter (so that those below a 
threshold on the LTV question received a turnout weight of zero and those above a weight of one) and 
others in a smoother manner (e.g. by dividing a 0-10 LTV response by 10). Some turnout weights were 
based only on an LTV question, while others used additional information such as age or past voting. 
The models used to generate the turnout weights were educated guesses, with the exception of TNS 
UK who used a model fitted to data from the 2010 British Election Study (which includes both an LTV 
question and a measure of validated vote).  
Recall that assumption A2 requires that probabilities of voting in the election are allocated to the 
respondents based on an accurate model for turnout, conditional on self-assessed likelihood of voting 
(L), voting intention (V) and auxiliary variables (X). Specifically, the weights should accurately describe 
these probabilities in the population of voters. This presents a problem for assessing the adequacy of 
 the turnout model, because this should ideally be done using a high quality pre-election probability 
sample in which LTV, intended vote, and turnout after the election are observed.  Unfortunately, no 
such study was undertaken in 2015.  What can be examined, though, is how well  𝑝𝑇𝑖  approximated 
𝑝(𝑇 = 1|𝑉, 𝐿, 𝑋, 𝑆 = 1) , i.e. the turnout probabilities in the poll samples. This is not conclusive 
evidence to make this assessment, because it requires the additional assumption that the model for 
these probabilities should be approximately the same for the poll respondents and the target 
population. The validity of this assumption cannot be directly assessed.   
----- [Figure 1 here] ----- 
Figure 1 provides information about the accuracy of the turnout weights as estimates of turnout 
probabilities, for respondents in the five re-contact surveys. The solid lines show the probability of 
turnout as a smoothed function of the turnout weights, so the accuracy of the weights as probabilities 
of voting can be judged by the proximity of the solid lines to the dashed lines (on which the reported 
turnout rate is equal to the actual turnout weight). For all but one of the pollsters it is clear that actual 
turnout was higher, sometimes substantially higher, than the turnout weights implied, except where 
the weight was close to 1 (the partial exception to this pattern was TNS UK, for whom turnout weights 
of less than 0.5 overestimated subsequent turnout). Some, though not all, of this inaccuracy in the 
turnout weights may be accounted for by over-reporting of turnout in the re-contact surveys.   
The bar chart at the bottom of each plot in Figure 1 shows the relative frequency of respondents with 
different values of the turnout weights.  It is clear that a large majority of the respondents received a 
weight of one. Such respondents were also essentially certain to report after the election that they 
had voted. Thus, while the calibration of turnout weights was poor across the full range of probabilities, 
for most of the poll respondents the weights were quite accurate because the vast majority reported 
that they would vote and they were allocated a turnout probability of 1.  
 The accuracy of the turnout weights are of little substantive interest in themselves but matter insofar 
as they affect estimated vote shares. Whether this was the case for the 2015 polls may be assessed 
by calculating vote intention estimates under different specifications for the turnout weights.  First, 
we can use the re-contact polls to examine if the estimated shares would have been different if 
turnout weights had not been needed at all, that is if the pollsters had known who would and would 
not turn out to vote.  This is done by calculating estimates using pre-election vote intention only for 
those respondents who are known (by self-report in the recontact surveys) to have voted in the 
election; these respondents can be assigned a turnout probability of 1. Estimates for the difference in 
the Conservative-Labour vote share using this approach are shown in the first row of Table 3.  They 
are between -2.1 and +0.5 percentage points, compared to -2.7 to +0.7 points for the final polls (the 
latter for all nine BPC members). There is, thus, no evidence that the poll estimates would have been 
more accurate, even had the pollsters known before the election which respondents would and would 
not turn out to vote.   
----- [Figure 2 here] ----- 
We can also examine the sensitivity of vote intention estimates by calculating the party shares with 
different specifications for the turnout weights, while keeping all other elements of the weighting 
unchanged.  An example is presented in Figure 2. which shows estimates of the Conservative lead for 
the final polls, with four different turnout weights (from left to right): (1) using only those respondents 
who said they were certain to vote, i.e. who gave the highest response to the LTV question; (2) the 
turnout weights that were used for the published estimates; (3) transformed weights (p+p*(1-p) 
where p is the original turnout weight) which would have been closer to the true turnout probabilities 
in Figure 1; and (4) giving every respondent a turnout probability of 1. These rather different 
specifications do not change the estimates in any substantial way. We have also used a range of 
turnout weights from a model-based approach applied to the 2010 and 2015 British Election Studies 
 (of the kind used by TNS UK).  These alternative probabilities also have no notable effect on the vote 
share estimates.       
It is worth noting that none of the pollsters included vote intention in their models for turnout 
probability, so they implicitly assumed that the probability does not depend on the party the 
respondent intends to vote for, once LTV and other variables are controlled.  If this assumption fails, 
supporters of one party would be more likely than another to vote, given their reported pre-election 
LTV. We refer to this possibility, which has the potential to cause biases in poll estimates of vote shares, 
as ‘differential turnout misreporting’. We can assess whether this occurred in 2015 by including vote 
intention as a predictor in a model predicting turnout probability. Using this specification the party 
variable is statistically significant for only one pollster, and here the effect is in the opposite direction 
to what would be required to explain the polling miss; those who said they intended to vote Labour 
were more likely to vote, given their answer to the LTV question. The re-contact surveys therefore 
show no evidence of differential turnout misreporting.  
In summary, there were notable inaccuracies in the turnout weights as estimates of actual turnout 
probabilities for the respondents to the 2015 election polls.  However, this made little difference to 
the final vote shares; estimates of the Conservative lead would not have been more accurate, even if 
the turnout weights had been based on self-reported vote after the election, or if they had been 
assigned in a very different set of ways. Neither is there evidence that respondents who reported 
intending to vote Labour may have overestimated their future likelihood of turnout more than 
Conservative intenders. We conclude, on this basis, that violations of assumption A2 on turnout 
weighting were not responsible for the 2015 polling miss. 
 
4.3 Representative sampling  
We have concluded that violations of assumptions A2 and A3 relating to late swing and turnout 
weighting made little or no contribution to the 2015 polling error.  By a process of elimination, then, 
 we are led to conclude that violation of assumption A1 - representative sampling - must have been 
the primary locus of the 2015 polling miss: the polls systematically over-represented Labour voters 
and under-represented Conservative voters in their weighted estimates.   
In this section, we examine what direct evidence there is to support the judgement that the polling 
miss was due to unrepresentative samples.  We first consider a comparison with two surveys that 
were undertaken shortly after the election and which used probability sampling designs: the British 
Election Study (BES) and the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey.  We then examine estimates of vote 
shares by sub-groups defined by the weighting variables, and then biases in estimates of other 
variables which are likely to be related to voting. While none of these lines of evidence can be 
considered conclusive in themselves, collectively they provide consistent evidence to support the 
conclusion that the poll samples were systematically biased in their composition relative to the target 
population. 
The BES and BSA employ what can be considered ‘gold standard’ procedures at all stages of their 
design but are most notably different to the polls in that they employ probability sampling rather than 
quota sampling.  It is important to be clear that probability sampling does not on its own guarantee 
accuracy of survey estimates; these types of surveys are themselves subject to various errors of 
observation and non-observation (Groves 1989). In particular, when a substantial proportion of the 
eligible sample fails to complete the survey, either through refusal to participate or failure to be 
contacted, there is a risk that estimates will be biased due to differential nonresponse (although 
recent research has shown the correlation between response rate and nonresponse bias to be 
considerably weaker than has historically been assumed; see Groves and Peytcheva 2008; Sturgis et 
al 2016).  As we shall see, however, in 2015 the BES and BSA were far more accurate than the pre-
election polls in their estimates of the vote distribution and, given the transparency and robustness of 
their underlying sampling procedures, it is reasonable to use them as a lens through which to assess 
the quality of the poll samples which were obtained using quite different approaches.  
 The reported vote distributions for the BES and BSA are shown in Figure 3, alongside the average vote 
intention estimates for the final polls and the election result.  It is immediately apparent that the BES 
and BSA produced more accurate estimates of the Conservative lead over Labour than the polls, with 
the BES showing a 7 point lead and the BSA a 6 point lead for the Conservatives.  Neither of these 
surveys were themselves completely accurate, with both significantly under-estimating the UKIP share, 
the BES over-estimating the Conservative share, and the BSA over-estimating the Labour share.  
----- [Figure 3 here] ----- 
This comparison is suggestive that the polls underestimated the Conservative lead as a result of their 
sampling procedures. However, it is inconclusive on this point because the BES and BSA differ from 
the polls in other respects, beyond their sample designs.  Most importantly, both were undertaken 
after the election had taken place. This means that there was no uncertainty (at least by self-report) 
about whether the respondents had voted or not when they reported their vote choice, while the 
polls had to factor in whether a respondent would actually vote or not to their pre-election estimates.  
The reported votes of the BES/BSA respondents might also have been influenced by their knowledge 
of the election result, which could not have been the case for the pre-election polls. Previous research 
has shown a tendency for respondents to disproportionately recall having voted for the winning party 
– so called ‘bandwagoning’ (Nadeau, et al. 1993) and such effects might plausibly have contributed to 
the difference in the lead estimates between the surveys and the polls in 2015.   
Another potentially consequential difference is the mode of interview, with the BES and BSA using 
face-to-face interviews and the polls using either telephone interviews or online self-completion. 
There is, however, no obvious reason to assume that face-to-face interviewing would, on its own, 
produce more accurate self-reports of vote choice than the other modes.  Indeed, the survey 
methodological literature suggests that the face-to-face interviewing should be more prone to 
measurement error due to socially desirable responding than telephone and self-completion modes 
 (Tourangeau, et al. 2000).  Nonetheless, these factors all render the headline comparison between 
the polls and BES/BSA ambiguous with regard to the underlying cause of the difference.  
Fortunately, we can effectively rule out the two most important of these design differences by 
considering the reported vote distributions for the polls that undertook re-contact surveys.  Because 
the re-contact surveys were carried out after the election, we can exclude timing relative to the 
election as a potential confounder.  Table 2 shows that the poll estimates (weighted for attrition) of 
the Conservative lead do not noticeably improve when the polls are undertaken after the election and 
respondents are reporting their actual, rather than their intended vote.  These comparisons, then, 
support the conclusion that the differences between the BES and BSA and the polls were due to 
differences in their sampling procedures, rather than to whether they were undertaken before or after 
the election. A caveat to this conclusion is that the fieldwork periods were much shorter for the re-
contact polls than for BES and BSA, so ‘bandwagoning’ may have been more prevalent in the latter 
than the former case. However, Mellon and Prosser (2017) demonstrate that this possibility has little 
empirical support, for the BES at least. 
----- [Figure 4 here] ----- 
Recall that assumption A2 for representative sampling requires that for any given value of the 
weighting variables X, observations (𝑉𝑖, 𝐿𝑖)  in a poll are a random sample from 𝑝(𝑉, 𝐿|𝑋)  in the 
population.  It is informative, therefore, to assess the extent to which the polls were in error not only 
in the aggregate but also across the weighting cells used by the pollsters.  Figure 4 presents estimates 
of the Conservative-Labour difference by exemplar weighting variables, compared with the actual 
election result (for region) or with estimates from the BES/BSA (combined where both are available, 
due to small sample sizes by weighting cells for each survey on its own). It can be seen that there is no 
apparent difference in the polling error between men and women. When considered by age band, 
however, the polls substantially under-estimate the Conservative lead amongst those aged 45-64 and, 
to a lesser extent, those aged 55-64. Here, of course, we must assume that the BES/BSA distribution 
 is approximately correct within age-bands, although this does not seem unreasonable, given that both 
surveys got the population estimate of the Conservative lead approximately correct.   
Considered by self-reported vote in the 2010 General Election, the pattern in Figure 4 suggests that 
the polls were most inaccurate for those who voted for the two main parties in 2010. Finally, at the 
Government Office Region level the results suggest that the polls particularly under-estimated the 
Conservative lead in regions where the Conservative vote share was higher than the national average; 
the East, East Midlands, South West, and South East. In sum, these analyses clearly demonstrate that 
the key assumption of representativeness of vote intention within weighting cells was strongly and 
consistently violated in the 2015 polls. The pattern that we observe in these charts also suggests a 
systematic tendency for the polls to under-estimate Conservative support in sub-groups where the 
Conservative lead over Labour is highest, e.g. older people, southern counties, and people who voted 
Conservative in 2010. We are not able to pursue this further empirically given the data available to us, 
but it seems likely that a key reason that the polls underestimated the Conservative lead over Labour 
is that their sampling procedures systematically under-represented Conservative voters within these 
kinds of Conservative supporting demographic groups.  
A third type of comparison is informative about the representativeness of the poll samples; how 
accurate the poll estimates are for other variables that were measured in the polls and which are 
themselves related to vote choice.  Consider, for example, sector of employment; it is known that, 
broadly, public sector workers are more likely to vote Labour and private sector workers are more 
likely to vote Conservative (Dunleavy 1980).  If polls that do not weight to population totals for 
employment sector were found to have over-estimated the proportion of voters who work in the 
public sector, then this would not only constitute evidence that the poll samples were 
unrepresentative with regard to employment sector, it would also suggest a potential cause of the 
bias in the vote choice estimate.  That is to say, by over-representing public sector workers in their 
samples, the polls would have over-estimated support for Labour and under-estimated support for 
 the Conservatives.  This approach is appealing because it indicates ways in which poll samples might 
be improved in the future, either through changes to sample recruitment procedures, or through 
improvements to quota and weighting targets (see for example Mellon and Prosser 2017; Rivers and 
Wells 2015).   
Unfortunately, the extent to which we are able to implement this strategy is constrained by the 
paucity of candidate variables in the poll samples for which gold standard estimates are also available.  
Variables which meet these twin criteria are, almost by definition, scarce.  If they had been collected, 
the pollsters would likely already be using them in their sampling and weighting procedures. 
Nonetheless, some variables are available which enable us to consider the polls from this perspective, 
albeit in a more limited manner than we would ideally like.  
The first example relates to the continuous age distribution within banded age ranges.  All pollsters 
weight their raw sample data to match the distribution of age by banded ranges in the population 
census. Three of the BPC members also recorded continuous age, making it possible for us to assess 
the age distribution within age bands and compare this to the distribution from the census and the 
BES/BSA (these three polls were all conducted online, so we cannot conclude that the same effect is 
apparent in phone samples).  Figure 5 displays this comparison for the oldest age band, those aged 65 
years and older.  It shows that the polls substantially over-represent people under the age of 70 and 
under-represent those aged 75 and older within this age band, while the BES and BSA do not. Indeed, 
the three polls included here contain almost no respondents aged 90 or above.  
----- [Figure 5 here] ----- 
This is itself direct evidence that poll samples can produce quite biased estimates of population 
characteristics. However, it also indicates the kinds of selection mechanism which might, in part, have 
led to the 2015 polling miss.  If the Conservative lead over Labour was bigger amongst voters aged 
over 74 than those aged between 65 and 74 years, then under-representing the older age group would 
 have biased the estimate of the Conservative lead toward zero.  In fact, the 2015 BES shows that the 
Conservatives held a 21 point lead over Labour amongst those aged over 74 and a 22 point lead 
amongst those aged 64-74.  So the under-representation of voters aged 75 and over in the poll 
samples seems unlikely to have made a notable contribution to the 2015 polling miss.  
A second example of biased estimates in the poll samples relates to reported turnout in the 2010 
General Election.  Figure 6 plots self-reported 2010 turnout by age band, for the 2015 polls and for 
the BES.  With one exception, the polls consistently over-estimate turnout in the 2010 election (even 
compared to the BES, where turnout may also be overreported), with a particularly large bias amongst 
those aged 18-24. Given that only around a third of this cohort would even have been eligible to vote 
in 2010, these are very substantial over-estimates of the true proportion. A similar pattern has been 
observed in pre-election polls for other indicators of political engagement (Rivers and Wells 2015; 
Mellon and Prosser 2017). 
----- [Figure 6 here] ----- 
In section 2 we identified assumption A1 of representative sampling to be a particularly strong one. In 
this section we have assessed the empirical evidence that this assumption was violated in the 2015 
polls. We have shown that estimates from surveys using random probability sampling produced 
accurate estimates of the Conservative lead over Labour (and that this difference cannot be attributed 
to their having been undertaken after the election), that the polls exhibited substantial biases within 
weighting cells, and that biases were evident on other variables in the poll datasets in addition to vote 
intention.  Individually and collectively, these findings support the conclusion that 
unrepresentativeness of the poll samples on vote intention was the key contributory factor in the 
2015 polling miss. 
6. Discussion 
In the months and weeks leading up to the 2015 general election the polls told a consistent story; the 
Conservatives and Labour were in a dead heat in the popular vote. This led media commentators, 
 party strategists, and the public to focus attention on the likely composition of a coalition, rather than 
on a single-party government led by the Conservatives who, of course, ultimately won the election 
with a 6.5% lead over Labour and an absolute majority in the House of Commons.  The expectation of 
a hung parliament in the final days and weeks of the campaign was so strong and widely held that the 
sense of shock and disbelief was palpable when the result of the exit poll was announced at 10pm on 
May 7th.  
Having considered a range of plausible contributory factors and data sources, our analyses lead us to 
conclude that the primary cause of the polling miss was that the samples were unrepresentative of 
the population of voters. In short, the methods used to collect samples of voters systematically over-
represented Labour supporters and under-represented Conservative supporters. The statistical 
adjustment procedures applied to the raw data did not mitigate this basic problem to any notable 
degree.  
We came to this conclusion partly by elimination of other putative causes of the error. The discrepancy 
between the point estimates of the Conservative lead in the polls and the election result cannot be 
attributed to sampling error. Using a new procedure for calculating the precision of vote share 
estimates from quota samples, we have shown that none of the BPC pollsters’ estimates contained 
the true lead of the Conservatives over Labour within the 95% confidence interval. We recommend 
that pollsters move to adoption of this, or a similar approach to estimating the sampling variance of 
their vote share estimate at future elections. We were also able to replicate all published estimates 
for the first, the penultimate, and the final published polls using the raw micro-data provided by the 
BPC pollsters, enabling us to rule out the possibility that some of the errors were due to flawed analysis 
or use of inaccurate weighting targets.  
We found some evidence that there may have been a very modest late swing to the Conservatives 
between the final polls and election day, although this can have contributed at most around one 
percentage point to the mean absolute error on the Conservative lead.  The widely held view that the 
 polling miss was due to deliberate misreporting - ‘shy Tories’ telling pollsters they intended to vote 
for other parties – is very difficult to reconcile with the results of the re-contact surveys carried out by 
the pollsters and with the British Election Study and British Social Attitude survey undertaken after 
the election using random probability sample designs. Ruling out late swing also enables us to discount 
measurement error arising from question wording and order as a possible cause, because this is a 
special case of the same over-arching phenomenon.  
Differential turnout was also pointed to after the election as a likely cause of the errors; so-called ‘lazy 
Labour’ supporters telling pollsters they would vote Labour but ultimately not turning out to vote.  
Data from a number of sources shows no support for differential turnout misreporting, or errors in 
predicted probabilities of turnout in general, making anything but a very small contribution to the 
polling errors. This means that we can also reject the possibility that un-registered voters made any 
contribution to the polling errors because this would manifest as an error of turnout weighting. 
If the potential causes considered above are ruled out, we are left to conclude that 
unrepresentativeness in the samples must have been the cause of the polling miss in 2015. On its own, 
a strategy which reaches a conclusion through elimination of alternative explanations is not very 
satisfactory, particularly when the evidence on which the preliminary eliminations are based is 
imperfect, as is the case here.  Had we been drawn, by a process of elimination, to conclude that the 
polling miss was due to a prima facie implausible explanatory factor - such as overseas voters - then 
we would question the validity of the process that led us to this inference.  But this is not the case 
here; we identified sampling and weighting procedures as representing inherent weaknesses in our 
description of the assumptions underlying the methodology of polling.   
We have also provided empirical evidence in support of the conclusion that the sampling procedures 
employed by the pollsters produced biased estimates of vote intentions. Random probability samples 
undertaken shortly after the election produced accurate estimates of the Conservative lead over 
Labour, suggesting that the less robust sampling procedures used by the polls were responsible for  
 the under-estimation of this key parameter. The difference in the estimate of the Conservative lead 
between the probability samples and the polls is still evident using the recontact surveys that were 
undertaken by a subset of pollsters, indicating that the sampling procedures rather than the timing of 
the fieldwork was the cause of the difference in the estimates of the lead. Additionally, we showed 
that the polls strongly violated the core assumption required for representative sampling; that the 
estimates of vote intention should be accurate within the weighting cells used for quotas and post-
stratification. It was particularly suggestive that the polls under-estimated the Conservative lead most 
in areas and sub-groups where the true Conservative lead was largest. Finally, we presented specific 
examples of two other variables in the poll samples, age and turnout in the 2010 election, on which 
biases were also evident. Taken together, these findings lead us to conclude that violation of the 
representative sampling assumption was the primary cause of the 2015 polling miss.  
What can be done to improve the representativeness of poll samples in the future? The answer to this 
question depends on whether the pollsters continue to employ quota methods, or switch to random 
probability sampling.  Due to the high cost of probability sampling, we expect the vast majority of 
opinion polls to continue using non-random sampling methods for the foreseeable future.  However, 
continuing with non-random sampling means there are only two broad strategies that can be pursued 
to improve sample representativeness.  Pollsters can take measures to increase the 
representativeness of respondents recruited to existing quota and weighting cells, or they can 
incorporate new variables into their weighting schemes which are related to both the probability of 
selecting into poll samples and vote intention.  These are not mutually exclusive strategies.   
How this is done will depend, to an extent, on the mode of interview of the poll. For phone polls this 
is likely to involve (but will not be limited to) using longer fieldwork periods, more call-backs to initially 
non-responding numbers (both non-contacts and refusals), and ensuring a more representative mix 
of landline and mobile phone numbers. We recognise that, taken to their logical extreme, these 
procedures would be practically equivalent to implementing a random probability design and would 
 therefore be expensive and time-consuming.  While, as we will note shortly, we would very much 
welcome the implementation of truly random sample designs, we acknowledge that the cost 
restrictions of true random methods make them impractical for the vast majority of pre-election 
phone polls.  The extended fieldwork periods required for high quality random samples also means 
they have obvious weaknesses for campaigns characterised by volatile voter preferences. 
Nevertheless, it would seem that there are gains to be made in quality without making the resultant 
design un-affordably expensive and lengthy. It may be that implementing procedures of this nature 
results in fewer polls being carried out than was the case in the last parliament, as the cost of 
undertaking each one would no doubt increase.  This would, in our view be no bad thing, so long as 
the cost savings that accrue from doing fewer polls are invested in quality improvements.  
For online polls the procedures required to yield more representative samples within weighting cells 
are also likely to involve longer field periods, more reminders, as well as differential incentives for 
under-represented groups, and changes to the framing of survey requests.  We encourage online 
pollsters to experiment with these and other methods in order to increase the diversity of their 
respondent pools.  
The second strategy pollsters can pursue to improve sample representativeness is to modify the 
variables used to create quota and weighting cells. Here, there is not such a clear trade-off between 
expense and quality as there is with obtaining more representative samples. If variables that are 
correlated with self-selecting into opinion polls and vote intention were readily available, pollsters 
would already be using them.  We also recommend caution in the use of variables for post-
stratification which do not have well defined and correctly known population totals.  
Despite its limitations, polling remains the most accurate means of estimating vote shares in elections 
by some margin and this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future.  While polls rarely 
produce exactly correct vote share estimates and are sometimes incorrect by substantial margins, 
they are considerably more accurate than any of the existing alternatives. Yet, it must be better 
 acknowledged that accurately predicting vote shares in an election is a very challenging task.  A 
representative sample of the general population must be obtained and accurate reports of party 
choice elicited from respondents. An approximately accurate method of determining how likely 
respondents are to cast a vote must be implemented and the sample of voters must not change their 
minds between taking part in the poll and casting their ballots.   What is more, the entire procedure 
must usually be carried out and reported on within a very short space of time and at very low cost.  
Given these many potential pitfalls, it should come as no surprise that the historical record shows 
polling errors of the approximate magnitude of 2015 occur at not infrequent intervals. 
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 Table 1. Published estimates of voting intention for different parties (as % of vote in Great Britain), 
from the final polls before the UK General Election on May 7th 2015.  
 Survey Days of Sample Party‡ 
Pollster mode† fieldwork size Con Lab Lib UKIP Green Other 
Populus O 5–6 May 3917 34 34 9 13 5 6 
Ipsos-MORI P 5–6 May 1186 36 35 8 11 5 5 
YouGov O 4–6 May 10307 34 34 10 12 4 6 
ComRes P 5–6 May 1007 35 34 9 12 4 6 
Survation O 4–6 May 4088 33 34 9 16 4 4 
ICM P 3–6 May 2023 34 35 9 11 4 7 
Panelbase O 1–6 May 3019 31 33 8 16 5 7 
Opinium O 4–5 May 2960 35 34 8 12 6 5 
TNS UK O 30/4–4/5 1185 33 32 8 14 6 6 
Ashcroft* P 5–6 May 3028 33 33 10 11 6 8 
BMG* O 3–5 May 1009 34 34 10 12 4 6 
SurveyMonkey* O 30/4-6/5 18131 34 28 7 13 8 9 
 
Election result 
 
  
 
37.7 
 
31.2 
 
8.1 
 
12.9 
 
3.8 
 
6.4 
Mean absolute error   3.9 2.7 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.1 
† O=online, P=phone 
‡ Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, UK Independence Party, Green Party, all others combined 
 * Not members of the British Polling Council (BPC) in May 2015 
** Calculated from the microdata provided by the pollsters. The interval estimate is a percentile interval calculated as 
described in Section 2.2, from 10,000 bootstrap samples. 
 
Table 2. Measures of uncertainty in estimates of voting intention from the final polls: Point estimates 
and 95% interval estimates for the Conservative-Labour difference, and standard errors (s.e.) 
and estimated design effects (d2) for the Conservative and Labour vote shares.  
Pollster Survey 
mode† 
Con-Lab (%) 
(election result = +6.5%) 
 
Con (%) 
 
Lab (%) 
 
  Est. 95% interval* s.e. d2 s.e. d2 N 
Populus O -0.1 (-2.5; +2.0) 0.7 0.82 0.7 0.73 3695 
Ipsos-MORI P -0.3 (-6.6; +6.1) 1.8 1.37 1.9 1.40 928 
YouGov O +0.4 (-1.1; +1.8) 0.4 0.76 0.4 0.76 9064 
ComRes P +0.8 (-4.6; +6.3) 1.5 0.86 1.9 1.30 852 
Survation O +0.1 (-2.2; +2.5) 0.7 0.79 0.7 0.85 3412 
ICM P +0.0 (-2.8; +3.1) 0.9 0.53 1.0 0.68 1681 
Panelbase O -2.7 (-5.6; +0.2) 0.9 1.17 0.9 1.16 3019 
Opinium O +0.4 (-1.8; +2.5) 0.6 0.42 0.7 0.47 2498 
TNS UK O +0.8 (-3.6; +5.2) 1.4 0.79 1.3 0.72 889 
Note: The interval estimates and standard errors have been calculated from the microdata provided by the pollsters, using 
bootstrap resampling with 10,000 bootstrap samples. Some of these replicated estimates differ slightly from the published 
results in Table 1, mainly because of rounding and differences in algorithms used for poststratification weighting.  
* Adjusted percentile interval.  
N = number of respondents who gave a voting intention for a party 
d2 = (s.e.)2/[p(1-p)/N] where p is the estimated vote share. 
 Table 3. Conservative lead over Labour (% for Great Britain), estimated from five post-election re-
contact surveys and (for the same respondents, those who reported that they had voted) from polls 
before the election. The election result was a 6.5% Conservative lead.   
 Pollster 
 TNS Populus ICM Survation Yougov 
Before election -2.1% -1.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 
After election 1.9% -0.4% 1.9% 3.8% -0.8% 
(Sample size) (1477) (3036) (2480) (1525) (6712) 
 
  
 Figure 1. Probability of turnout, estimated from five re-contact surveys, as a smoothed function of 
turnout weights for the same respondents obtained from pre-election polls (solid lines, with 95% 
confidence bands in gray shading). The bar charts at the bottom of each plot show the relative 
frequencies of the values of the turnout weights.  
 
 
  
  
Figure 2. Conservative lead over Labour (% for Great Britain), estimated from the final polls by the 
nine BPC members with different specifications of the turnout weights. From left to right, these 
specifications are: using only the respondents who said they were certain to vote; the original 
(company-specific) turnout weights (p), weights of p+p*(1-p), and using all respondents with weight 
1, irrespective of stated likelihood to vote.  The green line shows the true election result (+6.5%) and 
the dark red line the unweighted average of the figures for the nine polls. 
 
  
 Figure 3. Estimates of voting intention for different parties (as % of vote in Great Britain): British 
Election Study (BES; gold bars), British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA; yellow [middle bars]), and the 
average of final polls by the nine members of the British Polling Council. The election results are shown 
by the green lines. 
 
95% confidence intervals for BES and BSA estimates are also shown. 
 Figure 4. Conservative lead over Labour (% for Great Britain), estimated from nine final polls, separately by categories of some weighting variables (clockwise from top left: 
gender, age group, region, and party vote in the 2010 general election).    
           
     
Dark red line: Average of the polls; Gold: Estimate from combined BES/BSA sample, with 95% c.i. (2010 vote from BES only); Green: 2015 election result. In the plot for the 
2010 vote, the vertical axis is centered so that 0 represents the difference in the BES ( which is shown on the horizontal axis; for example, among those who reported voting 
Conservative in 2010, the Con-Lab difference in the BES was +82%)  
 Figure 5. Age distribution of the respondents aged 65 or over in three final polls, compared with the 
distribution in the British Election Study and the British Social Attitudes survey (combined sample; 
gold line) and in the 2011 census (green).  
 
  
 Figure 6. Proportion of individuals who report that they voted in the 2010 General Election, by age 
band (in 2015), estimated from nine final polls, compared to the estimates from the 2015 British 
Election Study (gold line, with 95 confidence intervals).  
 
 
